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ARTICLE
Imperishable Intellectual Creations:
The Limits of the First Sale Doctrine
I. Neel Chatterjee"
INTRODUCTION
Although the application of intellectual property laws has ad-
justed over time to respond to changing commercial practices and
evolving technologies,' the continuing stream of new scientific
advances mandates a rethinking of the very concepts on which
those laws are based. Copyright protection strikes a balance be-
tween the public interest in access to intellectual creations and the
private incentive to obtain financial rewards for such creations.2
One of the methods of compensating creators is by granting an ex-
clusive right of distribution to all copyright owners.3 The exclusive
* Law Clerk, Justice Mary Mullarkey, Colorado Supreme Court; J.D. Vanderbilt Law
School, 1994; B.A., Dartmouth College, 1991. Upon the completion of his clerkship, the
author will be an associate at Reinhart, Boerner, Van Deuren, Norris & Rieselbach,
Denver, CO. The author would like to thank Professor Jerome Reichman for his com-
ments on initial drafts of this paper. Portions of this paper were taken from the author's
prize-winning piece for the Nathan Burkan Competition at Vanderbilt Law School.
1. NATIONAL COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS
(CONTU), FINAL REPORT 9-12 (1979) [hereinafter CONTU FINAL REPORT].
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219, reh'g denied, 347
U.S. 949 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to
grant patents and copyright is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors in 'Science and the useful Arts."'); Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts
(PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093, 1095 (3d Cir. 1988); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151, 156 (1975); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPY-
RIGHT § 1.03[A] (1994) [hereinafter NIMMER]; 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCI-
PLES, LAW & PRACTICE § 1.1 (1989); Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and
Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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right of distribution grants a copyright holder the right to benefit
financially from the first sale of copies of literary or artistic works
that are embodied in tangible mediums of expression (referred to
as the "first sale doctrine").4
Recently, an author's distribution right has faced a new chal-
lenge due to the increased durability of mediums of expression.
The precarious balance between the public interest in access to
intellectual creations and the author's market interest is destabilized
by this increased durability. Durability extends the life and the
quality of a publicly distributed intellectual good and in turn allows
for widespread access to individual copies (e.g., through resale and
rentals), thus reducing the need for consumers to purchase new
copies.5 Congress has acted in an ad hoc fashion at times to pro-
tect the author's market interest when the distribution right has
been threatened by durability and widespread access. The changes
and adjustments enacted by Congress, however, do not fully ad-
dress the underlying problems causing tension in the distribution
right. As a result, entirely different rights are emerging for the
creators of different forms of copyrightable creations depending on
the nature of the market for each type of artistic creation. Adjust-
ments to lending and rental rights reflect uncertainty about the
continuing viability of the first sale doctrine for many types of
expression. Public lending rights and resale royalty laws--enacted
as droit de suite rights in other countries-also demonstrate a con-
cern for the preservation of authors' market interests but have not
yet received the same support in the United States.6
One of the most current examples of instability in the copyright
paradigm is the effect that compact discs ("CDs") have on the
durability and access to the market for musical works.7 Congress
has acted to limit rentals of CDs and phonorecords, but has yet to
address the controversial issue of CD resales. Additionally, elec-
tronic distribution channels, such as the Internet, pose an imminent
4. See infra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 45-60 (public lending) and 154-195 (droit de suite) and accompa-
nying text.
7. See infra notes 196-208 and accompanying text.
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threat to the distribution right as well as other exclusive rights.
Electronic distribution channels provide simultaneous, unlimited
access to multiple users from a single tangible copy. Since the
current copyright regime only requires compensation for the repro-
duction of a tangible copy, durability of an electronically-distribut-
ed product increases the amount of public access to a single good
without providing extra financial rewards to the creator.
Thus, the market rewards for the intellectual creation is not
reflective of actual consumer access and use. In the past, Congress
has made piecemeal alterations to copyright law to compensate for
this problem, but it now needs to evaluate the viability of the first
sale doctrine in the context of increasingly durable secondary mar-
kets. A potential solution to this problem would be to enact a
uniform system of compulsory commercial blanket licensing to
protect an author's economic interest in creating a work.8 To en-
sure proper compensation, Congress must enact laws to expand the
scope of the exclusive rights to compensate the author based on the
nature and extent of the use, rather than the current framework
which is based on tangible property interests. Such a proposed sys-
tem creates rights which adequately protect a creator's market in-
terests and maintain the highest possible economic efficiencies for
consumers of goods as well as the distributors of such goods.
I. THE DISTRIBUTION RIGHT UNDER COPYRIGHT LAW
By granting a limited monopoly over an intellectual creation,
copyright law balances an author's interest in remuneration with
the public's interest in access to the author's works.9 This monop-
oly, in the form of a copyright, allows a creator to reap the eco-
nomic benefits of his labor by selling the creation in the market-
place-thereby controlling the scope of its use.'0 The market inter-
est for creators is preserved through the exclusive nature of intel-
lectual property rights." Under this scheme, the authors have the
8. See infra notes 226-251 and accompanying text.
9. 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 1.2.
10. Id.
11. The privileges granted under copyright law give the copyright owner the exclu-
1995]
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sole right to profit from the initial sale of their copyrighted works
as well as to retain various commercially valuable rights for a lim-
ited period of time.
12
On the other hand, since the public desires access to these
works, a strong incentive exists to avoid granting overly broad
protection which would limit the ability of others to develop future
works based on the creation, 13 or to use the goods for education,
news, or commentary. 14 To satisfy this public interest, the monop-
oly conveyed in the manner of expression is limited by sections
106A to 120 of the Copyright Act.
15
Exclusive rights provide the basic scheme for the exploitation
of a copyrighted work. 16  For musical works, the public perfor-
mance right and the distribution right are particularly important.
1 7
sive right to authorize: the reproduction of the copyrighted work in copies and
phonorecords; the adaptation of the copyright in the form of a derivative work; the distri-
bution of the copies or phonorecords to the public; the public performance of the work;
and the public display of the work. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
12. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-305 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Some have characterized the
time limits as "lead" time to exploit the creation before others. See, e.g., Michael
Lehmann, Property and Intellectual Property-Property Rights as Restrictions on Compe-
tition in Furtherance of Competition, 20 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT 1, 14-15
(1989) (characterizing the exclusive rights for a limited duration as artificial lead time in
intellectual property systems); J.H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International
Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L.
747, 803 (1989) (characterizing the exclusive right to reproduce as a statutory period of
artificial lead time). See generally ROBERT P. BENKO, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS: ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES 21-24 (1987) (discussing the benefits that
copyright law confers upon the general public).
13. 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 1.2; 1 NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.03[A]; Kenneth
R. Corsello, Note, The Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990: Another
Bend in the First Sale Doctrine, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 177, 183 (1991).
14. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (fair use exceptions).
15. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A-120 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
16. Shira Perlmutter, Resale Royalties for Artists: An Analysis of the Register of
Copyrights' Report, 40 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 284, 293 (1992) ("Copyright's inethodology
is to compensate authors not when their works are created, but when they are exploited
by others"). See also supra note 3.
17. STANLEY ROTHENBERG, COPYRIGHT AND PUBLIC PERFORMANCE OF MUSIC 26-27
(1987). The public performance right extends only to the underlying written composition
and not to the sound recording. See SIDNEY SHEMEL & M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY, THIS
BUSINESS OF MUSIC 39-43 (1990). For sound recordings embodied in phonorecords, these
exclusive rights are particularly important because sound recordings of musical works are
[Vol. 5:383
THE LIMITS OF THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE
These rights provide the means by which a writer collects royalties
and is rewarded for public performances and sales of copies of the
work.'8 Thus, preservation of these rights is pivotal to authors and
creators of musical works under the current copyright paradigm.
Section 109 of the Copyright Act subjects an author's distribu-
tion right to the first sale doctrine.' 9 The doctrine entitles a pur-
chaser of a copy of a copyrighted work to use or dispose of that
copy freely without paying a royalty to the copyright holder.20
Although the purchaser may freely dispose of the copy, he is still
bound by the other exclusive rights granted to the author under
copyright law.2' By limiting a copyright owner's control over the
future disposition of copies that have entered the stream of com-
merce, the first sale doctrine supports the policy of freedom of
alienation.22 The freedom of alienation policy allows the owner of
property to sell, rent, or dispose of property free of any encum-
brances. 23 The policy was intended to promote economic efficien-
cies and allow for simple, efficient transfer of goods.24 U.S. law
only entitled to the rights of reproduction and distribution. Id. See also Judy A. Kim,
Note, The Performers' Plight in Sound Recordings-Unique to the U.S.: A Comparative
Study of the Development of Performers' Rights in the United States, England and
France, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 453 (1986) (discussing performers' rights and
neighboring rights in various countries).
18. See generally SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 17, at 39-43, 176-90 (dis-
cussing the mechanics of compensating authors and publishers in the music business).
19. "Notwithstanding the provisions of § 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or
phonorecord lawfully made under this title or any person authorized by such owner, is
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the
possession of that copy or phonorecord." 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988).
20. 2 NIMMER, supra note 2, §§ 8.12[A], [B][2]; 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 5.6.1.
21. For example, the purchaser may not publicly perform or display the purchased
copy without the copyright owner's consent. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
22. The first sale doctrine was originally conceived under European patent law and
was eventually adopted into copyright under English common law which disapproved of
restraints on alienation of owned property. David H. Horowitz, The Record Rental
Amendment of 1984: A Case Study in the Effort to Adapt Copyright Law to New Technol-
ogy, 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 31, 34-38 (1987); John M. Kemochan, The Distribu-
tion Right in the United States of America: Review and Reflections, 42 VAND. L. REV.
1407, 1412-14 (1989).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §§ 4.1-4.3 (1988).
24. Id.; see generally Michael D. Kirby, Restraints on Alienation: Placing A 13th
Century Doctrine in a 21st Century Perspective, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 413 (1988) (discuss-
ing current restraints on alienation).
1995]
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effectively allows a purchaser to obtain a copy with the absolute
minimum of limitations necessary to protect the market interests of
the author.25 In this manner, the purchaser obtains the distribution
right with respect to that particular copy under the first sale doc-
trine.26
II. ECONOMIC TENSIoNSWITH THE DISTRIBUTION RIGHT
The money obtained by a copyright holder through the distribu-
tion right is a function of the volume of sales times the royalty
paid per unit. 27  The copyright holder expects to obtain a royalty
each time a copy of the creation is purchased. Since the copyright
holder initially controls the entire inventory of her work, she is free
to exploit the limited monopoly power as she sees fit.28 This limit-
ed monopoly allows the copyright holder to limit the supply of the
work and to attain quasi-monopolistic prices by such restraints. 29
In a primary market with no possibility of secondary markets, the
25. 1 NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.03[A]; 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 5.6.1.
26. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1908) (stating that a copy-
right owner extinguished sale rights upon initial vending and owner could not compel
retailers to sell at a certain price); United States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904 (1978); United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929 (1977). See also Richard Colby, The First Sale Doctrine-The
Defense that Never Was?, 32 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 77 (1985) (discussing the history and
application of the first sale doctrine); Julie S. Congdon, Case Note, The First Sale Doc-
trine of Copyright Law Closes Another Avenue of Redress, 34 VILL. L. REV. 597 (1989)
(evaluating the first sale doctrine and importation right).
27. See SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 17, at 3-6 (discussing various royalty
arrangements and rates).
28. S.J. Liebowitz, Some Puzzling Behavior by Owners of Intellectual Products: An
Analysis, 5 CONTEMP. POL'Y ISSUES 44, 46 (1987). The term "limited monopoly" is used
in this context because of the fair use and other exceptions to the exclusive rights. Be-
cause the rights are exclusive, but not absolute, the monopoly conferred on a copyright
owner is limited.
29. Potential substitutes limit the monopoly power granted by copyright. Id. Some
consumers, however, will choose to either purchase a given work or not buy one at all.
As such, some intermediate price between marginal price and marginal revenue exists
where the copyright holder sells at a monopolistic-type price. Id. But see Report of the
Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6 (Comm. Print 1961), reprinted
in 3 GEORGE S. GROSSMAN, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 3-6
(1976).
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copyright holder, as a quasi-monopolist, can distribute the good at
any supply level.30 By determining supply, the copyright holder
can extract a monopoly price for the work-thereby effectively
charging any price for the work.3 Only those consumers who
value the product and who are willing to accept the seller's price
can obtain the good. By adjusting the supply against demand, the
copyright holder can maximize profit levels.32
As a good becomes partially durable, secondary markets devel-
op. Once the price in secondary markets exceeds the value the
initial purchaser retains in the good, the purchaser may choose to
sell the good in secondary markets.33 The possibility of secondary
markets, in turn, expands the number of resellers demanding the
initial seller's product.34 In the primary market, the purchasers
attach value to certain qualities, such as: (1) being the first owner;
(2) obtaining a high quality good; (3) retaining the ability to sell in
secondary markets; and (4) merely possessing the good for a period
of time.35 As a good becomes more durable, secondary markets
gain in importance and become a viable alternative to primary mar-
kets. Secondary market consumers often do not place a premium
on being the first purchaser of a good, and they place a lower value
on obtaining a high quality good.36 Rather, these secondary market
consumers are satisfied with mere possession and use and will
ordinarily pay a lower price than they would in the initial market.37
30. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES &
POLICY 224-27 (1986) (discussing supply decisions of monopolists).
31. This value will normally be higher than the competitive price. Id. at 224-28.
32. Id. at 224-27; see KARL E. CASE & RAY C. FAIR, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS
303-23, 334-44 (1989).
33. See generally R.H. Coase, Durability and Monopoly, 15 J.L. & ECON. 143
(1972) (discussing instability in monopolistic markets caused by durability); John Conlisk
et al., Cyclic Pricing By A Durable Goods Monopolist, 99 Q.J. ECON. 489 (1984) (dis-
cussing supply and pricing decisions of monopolist to ensure maximum profits).
34. See generally Coase, supra note 33, at 143-49 (discussing the economic under-
pinnings of a highly durable secondary market).
35. See Daniel K. Benjamin & Roger C. Kormendi, The Interrelationship Between
Markets for New and Used Durable Goods, 17 J.L. & ECON. 381, 397 (1974), for a
thorough economic analysis of these principles.
36. Coase, supra note 33, at 144; Benjamin & Kormendi, supra note 35, at 382-88.
37. Coase, supra note 33, at 147-48.
1995]
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As goods become extremely durable, the secondary market and
the initial market begin to coalesce.38 When a good is very dura-
ble, it will not deteriorate over time, thus facilitating repeated ac-
cess by a number of users. 39 Therefore, with a highly durable
good, the quality of the product in initial and secondary markets
will not differ significantly. The initial sales market, therefore, will
no longer necessarily include the discriminating consumer, since
the increased durability allows him to purchase in a subsequent
market at a discounted rate without loss of quality.4 The remain-
ing customers in the initial sales market will accordingly be the
vendors in the subsequent markets for the product. These custom-
ers will also be those purchasers who value being the first owner
of the good.41 Thus, with increased secondary market durability,
the quantity demanded and the price charged for initial sales will
likely decrease.42 In the current copyright paradigm, the net effect
is thus a loss in profits and royalties to the copyright owner be-
cause of loss of sales in the initial markets.
Finally, when a good becomes imperishable and provides un-
limited concurrent access to all consumers at near perfect quality,
the correlation between price, possession, and quantity is virtually
destroyed.43 The supplier need only place one product into the
market, and all those who want access can have it. Supply, then,
becomes independent of possession or access, and the supplier
loses the ability to control the price of the work. Consequently, the
durable goods monopolist faces tremendous instability to his mo-
nopoly when a good becomes imperishable without proper safe-
guards.'
38. Id. at 143.
39. Id. at 144.
40. Id.
41. Benjamin & Kormendi, supra note 35, at 382-88.
42. Coase, supra note 33, at 144.
43. Id. Although Coase did not specifically identify this as a result, the indepen-
dence of price and quantity when unlimited access is available is a logical conclusion of
his theory.
44. Under the current copyright scheme, the primary remuneration rights of distribu-
tion and reproduction are severely undermined. See INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUC-
[Vol. 5:383
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IR. EARLY CHALLENGES TO THE DISTRIBUTION RIGHT: PUBLIC
LENDING AND RENTAL
A. The Public Lending Right
Perhaps the most controversial challenge to the first sale doc-
trine is the public lending right. As enacted in foreign countries,
public lending rights compensate authors for a library's interference
with the distribution right.45 Public libraries purchase only a few
copies of a book and disseminate them to a large number of people
who might otherwise buy the book. To counteract the detrimental
effect that such lending has on an author's income, the public lend-
ing right compensates authors for the lost sale of copies.4 6
Directly opposed to the public lending right is the first sale
doctrine, which allows a purchaser to obtain a particular copy with-
out any such restraints.47 Under the first sale doctrine, libraries
have no duty to compensate authors for the lending of any work.48
By enacting a public lending right, however, a state recognizes the
need to balance the first sale doctrine against the market interfer-
ence caused by the impact of lost sales of such works. In such
cases, the rights granted under copyright law are expanded to cover
future uses of a copyrighted work by libraries, and the libraries
must pay a fee for such use.
TURE: A PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, July 1994, 34-42 [hereinafter NII REPORT]. Additionally, such
access can fundamentally undermine the other exclusive rights, such as the derivative and
public performance rights. id. at 42-44.
45. Daniel Y. Mayer, Note, Literary Copyright and Public Lending Right, 18 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 483 (1986) (discussing international application of public lending
rights). See also BRIGID BROPHY, A GUIDE TO PUBLIC LENDING RIGHT 2 (1983) (outlin-
ing the mechanics of public lending right systems); LEON E. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND
FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT: THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS TENSIONS IN THE 1976 COPYRIGHT
ACT 110 (1978) (discussing the tension in the public lending right under the current
copyright system).
46. ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 493
(1993). See STEPHEN M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING
RIGHTS 71-73 (1989) (explaining the policy underlying the public lending right).
47. 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, § 5.6.1.1(c); NEIL BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW §§
4:4, 5:18 (1981 & Supp. 1992).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1988).
19951
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• The public lending right has not been adopted by the United
States but is part of the law in at least thirteen other countries.4 9
Germany has one of the most advanced public lending right sys-
tems, protecting all copyrighted materials owned by a library.50 Its
public lending right provides an author with compensation from
libraries via a general contract with collecting societies which are
grouped by forms of expression (e.g., pictures, movies, music, or
literature). 5' The collecting societies receive a percentage of a
lump sum public lending right payment authorized by the German
government based on their share of total lending.52 The collecting
society then distributes the income it receives based upon internal
administrative procedures."
Each country which has adopted a public lending right, with the
exception of Germany, enacted it independently of copyright law.54
The public lending right is often not incorporated into existing
copyright systems in order to avoid extending the rights to non-
nationals as would be required under existing international copy-
right agreements. 55 The extension of such rights to non-nationals
49. Countries having a public lending right include Germany, Sweden, Great Britain,
Denmark, Iceland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, France, Belgium, Norway, The
Netherlands, and Finland. Different countries have different means of compensation for
authors. In some countries, the royalty is correlated to the number of times a book is
loaned to a consumer. In others, the royalty is calculated based on the holdings of the
library, regardless of the frequency of loans of the copy. Finally, some countries provide
for a one-time payment to the author at the time of purchase of a copy. STEWART, supra
note 46, at 418-20; Jennifer M. Schneck, Note, Closing the Book on the Public Lending
Right, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 891-97 (1988). Unlike the United States, many countries
have expanded rights for authors and creators. The widespread acceptance of public
lending rights in other countries-as well as the continuing debate about such a right in
the United States--demonstrates an widespread concern for the market interference to an
author's distribution right under international as well as U.S. copyright law.
50. STEWART, supra note 46, at 418-20.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Mayer, supra note 45, at 495-96.
54. Schneck, supra note 49, at 897.
55. Id. at 898-99. Under the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion, copyright protection extended to nationals of a country mustalso be extended to
authors from all other convention countries. Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised, Paris, July 24, 1971, 828
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; Gerald Dworkin, Public Lending
[Vol. 5:383
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would diminish economic resources without directly benefiting the
public of any given nation.56 Enacting a public lending right for
non-nationals also would not enhance the access already enjoyed
by the general public.57
The United States has considered the public lending right and
on occasion has examined its effect on authors. 58 In fact, Congress
specifically enacted the first sale doctrine so as to allow library
lending without infringing an author's copyright.59 The Record of
the House states:
[t]he outright sale of an authorized copy of a book frees it
from any copyright control over its resale price or other
conditions of its future disposition. A library-that has ac-
quired ownership of a copy is entitled to lend it under any
conditions it chooses to impose.'
B. Rentals
Closely related to the public lending right is the rental of vari-
ous forms of copyrighted subject matter. Rentals are similar to
public lending in that numerous members of the public are provid-
ed with access to a single copy of a work. Rentals are different,
Right-The UK Experience, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 49, 58 (1988). The German
system limits the lending right to non-nationals whose countries afford German nationals
a public lending right. Schneck, supra note 49, at 898.
56. Schneck, supra note 49, at 899.
57. Id. at 905-06. This policy, however, is arguably inconsistent with the Berne
Convention's national treatment clause. See Beme Convention, supra note 55, art. 14'
(requiring that each signatory country provide as full copyright protection to citizens of
other signatory nations as they give to their own citizens).
58. Copyright Law Revision Hearings on S. 597 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks, & Copyrights of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 591
(1967) (statement of Dr. Charles F. Gosnell, Chairman, Comm. on Copyright Issues, Am.
Library Ass'n) (commenting on the effects of a public lending right).
59. H.R. 553, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5693 (1976). For further examples, see infra
notes 61-89 and accompanying text concerning record rentals and notes 108-114 concern-
ing software rentals. In both situations, Congress has specifically carved out the public
lending right for non commercial institutions.
60. H.R. 553, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5693 (1976).
19951
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however, because users are charged for the access and because the
renter's motive is profit-based. The renter extracts his profits with-
out any duty to compensate the creator of the work. Congress has
dealt with rentals on a case-by-case basis and has developed differ-
ing policies depending on the medium of expression and the use of
the goods.
1. Record Rentals
The rental of sound recordings displaces sales and diminishes
the revenue pool available to the author."' Record rentals interfere
with the sales market because people who would otherwise pur-
chase a record will rent instead. Accordingly, the market pool of
purchasers decreases because of the extra access provided by rent-
als. Specifically, rentals may directly and substantially interfere
with an author's exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution,
since a person renting a tape or compact disc may copy the work
and never purchase a legitimate copy.62 Administrative costs of
monitoring such infringement are prohibitively high, thereby mak-
ing an author's rights virtually unenforceable.63 A private user,
then, can reproduce the work without any liability, thus diminishing
the author's primary market. :As a result, the record rental market
61. H.R. 1029, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1983), reprinted in Audio and Video First Sale
Doctrine: Hearings on H.R. 1027, H.R. 1029 and S. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 729 (1983) (statement of Stanley Gortikov, Pres. of Recording
Industry Ass'n of America) [hereinafter House Hearings]; S. 33, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983), reprinted in Audio and Video Rental: Hearings on S. 32 and S. 33 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1983) (Senate Hearings) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
62. Some have commented, however, that the first sale doctrine explicitly permitted
a dealer to lawfully engage in the commercial rental of records, even when the express
purpose and effect of the rentals was "to enable the consumer to make a copy of the
record on a home audio cassette recorder." Horowitz, supra note 22, at 31.
63. H.R. Rep. No. 735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6938 (stating that "technology has been both a boon and a bane to
authors: a boon because it has fostered new methods of creation and distribution; a bane
because it has also resulted in inexpensive, easy and quick ways to reproduce copyrighted
works, in many cases in private or semi-private environments that render detection all but
impossible").
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creates a substantial interference with the compensation scheme
under copyright law because it impedes the author from fully ex-
ploiting his distribution and reproduction rights.
Japan's experience with record rentals highlights the effects of
record rentals on the dilution of an author's rights. The early
1980s were marked by a proliferation of record rental stores in
Japan.' Nearly 20% of all retail record outlets were rental stores.65
More than 97% of all rental customers stated that they made home
recordings of rented records.6 Further, 61% percent of the custom-
ers loaned or gave reproductions to their friends.67 This develop-
ment had a devastating effect on the Japanese record industry, and
Congress feared that a similar development in the United States
could severely undermine the rights of American authors.68
Further complicating this concern was the advent of CDs in the
1980s. CDs not only provide extremely high quality sound, but
they are also highly durable. CDs are not subject to the wear and
tear of tapes and records because the disc is played by laser scan-
ning (which does not cause deterioration) rather than by direct
physical interaction of a metal stylus or tape heads. A CD can be
rented hundreds of times without any reduction in sound quality or
need for repurchase.69 As.a result, any renter can copy the sound
recording at near perfect quality and at much less than the autho-
rized purchase price.70
In response.to the technological advances in sound recordings,
Japan developed a licensing system for the rental of
phonorecords.7' Under this system, rental stores could continue to
rent sound recordings in return for a royalty on each phonorecord
64. Horowitz, supra note 13, at 31-32.
65. Id. at 32.
66. Senate Hearings, supra note 61, at 248-49.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Horowitz, supra note 22, at 33.
70. See 135 Cong. Rec. S568 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch);
H.R. Rep. No. 987, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 n.6 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2899.
71. Horowitz, supra note 22, at 33; Robert Adachi & Michael Fedrick, A Compari-
son of Responses to the Record Rental Industry Under Japanese and U.S. Copyright Law,
9 PAC. BASIN L. J. 210, 212 (1991).
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rented.72 This system ensured a continuous stream of royalties as
partial compensation for the potential loss of sales income that the
author experienced.73
In the United States, bills were introduced by Senator Charles
Mathias, Jr. and Representative Don Edwards to reconcile the first
sale doctrine with the unique compensatory problems raised by
rentals.74 These bills prohibited the owner of a particular
phonorecord or videotape from renting, leasing, or lending the
phonorecord or videotape for purposes of direct or indirect com-
mercial advantage unless authorized by the copyright owner.75
Although the bills received widespread support from the recording
industry and the Register of Copyrights,76 the proposal was aban-
doned due to the decision in the Betamax77 case, which held that
home videotaping of copyrighted materials for time-shifting purpos-
es was a fair use.
Although the decision in Betamax weakened the debate sur-
rounding videotape rentals, the recording industry continued to
pursue legislation banning the rental of phonorecords. 78  Record
rental was still in its infancy in the United States, and the recording
industry sought to limit expansion of the record rental industry
before it experienced the same degree of growth as in Japan.7 9 The
recording industry was concerned that once a full-fledged rental
industry was established, the rental industry would have sufficient
political power to fight any legislation against record rental.80
In 1984, Congress enacted the Record Rental Amendment Act
which banned the unlicensed rental of records.8' The Amendment
72. Adachi & Fedrick, supra note 71, at 215.
73. id.
74. See supra note 61.
75. Senate Hearings, supra note 61, at 127; House Hearings, supra note 61, at 128.
76. Senate Hearings, supra note 61, at 31-33, 356-421; House Hearings, supra note
61, at 548.
77. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
78. Adachi & Fedrick, supra note 71, at 216-18.
79. Id. at 218.
80. Id.
81. Record Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (1984)
[hereinafter the Amendment] (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(b)(1)(A) &
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expanded the distribution right of an author by exempting
phonorecords from some of the first sale doctrine limitations of
section 109(a). a2 The Amendment forbade the use of phonorecords
for direct or indirect commercial advantage by rental, lease, or
lending without the consent of the copyright owner. 83 The Amend-
ment was passed, according to a Senate report, because
[t]he Committee has no doubt that the purpose and result of
record rentals is to enable and encourage customers to tape
their rented albums at home .... Thus, a record rental and
a blank tape purchase is now an alternative way of obtain-
ing a record without having to buy one. The rental is a
direct displacement of a sale.8
The report continued on to say that
[c]ommercial record rentals in the United States hurt copy-
right owners when record rentals displace record sales.
This is because record rentals are almost invariably fol-
lowed by unauthorized home taping, thereby resulting in
even fewer record sales. Yet copyright owners are not
compensated either for the rental itself or for the unautho-
rized home recording.85
Congress was careful, ' however, to carve the public lending
right out of the act. 6 Section 109(b)(1)(A) specifically states that
"[n]othing in the preceding sentence shall apply to the rental, lease,
or lending of a phonorecord for nonprofit purposes by a nonprofit
library or nonprofit library or nonprofit educational institution. 8 7
The Amendment was one of the first situations where copyright
law was specifically amended to address the threat of particular
115(c)(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
82. Kernochan, supra note 22, at 1418.
83. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
84. S. REP. No. 98-162, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983).
85. Id. at 3. Such statements recognize the interference with both the distribution
and reproduction rights.
86. See 135 Cong. Rec. S568 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch);
H.R. Rep. No. 987, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 n.6 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2899.
87. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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technological advances to distribution and reproduction rights (i.e.
increased access to phonorecords, via rentals and unauthorized
home copying of phonorecords). It presented the first instance
where the first sale doctrine was modified to ensure an author's
economic interests in the face of widespread public access. The
Amendment acknowledged the threat to the exclusive rights caused
by rentals and acted to protect the limited monopoly granted under
existing copyright law. The Amendment, however, only limited the
lending of a phonorecord by commercial entities." It did not pro-
hibit future sales of the initial copy of the phonorecord by noncom-
mercial actors. 9
2. Video Rentals
The technological advent of the home video cassette recorder
also posed new challenges to the first sale doctrine. Video rentals
were a concern because the movie industry feared that such rentals
would replace box office sales.90 Since a single tape could be
viewed by a large number of people over a long period of time,
movie producers and the Register of Copyrights advocated a
change in the first sale doctrine for videocassettes. 91 Movie pro-
ducers argued that the first sale doctrine precluded them from par-
ticipating in rental profits and possibly interfered with their ability
88. Id.
89. id.
90. See Senate Hearings, supra note 61, at 313-14 (testimony of David Lange, Pro-
fessor of Law, Duke University).
91. The Register of Copyrights reported:
[T]he first sale doctrine had existed since the beginning of printing... and had
never been perceived as a threat to the sale of new copies of the work. The
major reason for this seems to be that the public prefers to purchase unused
books: the second hand copy generally is not competitive with an unused book.
In the case of videocassette rentals, the same product is being rented as is sold.
The competition is direct.
Senate Hearings, supra note 61, at 248-50 (1983). See also Joseph.J. Beard, The Sale,
Rental, and Reproduction of Motion Picture Videocassettes: Piracy or Privilege?, 15 N.
ENG. L. REv. 435 (1980) (discussing potential interferences with the first sale doctrine
caused by the emerging market for videocassettes); Debra A. Opri, Note, Video Rentals
and the First Sale Doctrine: The Deficiency of Proposed Legislation, 8 WHITER L.
REv. 331, 338 (1986) (criticizing act which would limit video cassette rentals).
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to make money through the box office.92 Although the movie in-
dustry acted to expand the sales market for tapes, the market de-
mand for rentals eclipsed that of sales--effectively eliminating
sales as a viable method for recovering lost profits.93
Video rentals were originally included in the Amendment, but
were removed because of the then-pending Betamax case. 94 The
Betamax case held that the use of a videocassette recorder to record
a broadcast show simply assisted in "shifting" the timing of a par-
ticular show rather than contributing to any copyright infringement
or pecuniary loss to a creator.95 Rather than opening the door for
unauthorized and wholesale copying, the Betamax decision has not
unduly burdened the movie and television industry for two reasons.
First, the quality of a rental videotape is superior to a home copy,
and the cost to rent a videotape is similar to the cost of a blank
tape.' Consumers therefore would rather pay the cost of renting
a videotape, because in this manner they can obtain a higher quali-
ty tape for about the same price as an unlawful copy. 97 Second,
people generally listen to repeat performances of a musical work,
but consumers are less likely to watch the same movie repeatedly.98
Thus, they would be more willing to rent a videocassette than to
purchase a blank tape or a copy of a videocassette. 99
The advent of videocassette rentals did not precipitate any
amendment to the first sale doctrine despite the attempts to do so.
In fact, studios are free to sell their cassettes to both private and
92. Senate Hearings, supra note 61, at 313-14; see generally Opri, supra note 91
(providing a brief history surrounding the proposed video rental legislation).
93. Opri, supra note 91, at 338-39; ROBERT SIMON, THE MOVIE INDUSTRY: THE BIG
PICTURE 628 (1984).
94. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
95. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 443 (1984).
96. House Hearings, supra note 61, at 238 (statement of economist Nina W. Cor-
nell).
97. Id.
98. id. This fact is also demonstrative of the differing nature of the movie and music
markets. Movies have numerous mediums which fulfill differing consumer needs (i.e. big
screens, television, cable). Music, on the other hand, is produced in limited mediums of
expression Which all serve the same functional purpose. Because of the nature of the
movie industry, the market interference for any given medium is not as severe.
99. Corsello, supra note 13, at 192-93; Senate Hearings, supra note 61, at 238.
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commercial actors, and the purchasers may resell or rent the tapes
without restriction. 1 The relative strength and growth of the video
rental industry has precluded any legislative action similar to the
Amendment.)°0
The future of videocassette rentals in an increasingly global
trade regime is less certain, however. Recently, the United States
implicitly has acknowledged that commercial rental of cinemato-
graphic works and software is a potential problem. 102 Article 11 of
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT"), Agreement
on Copyright and Related Rights states:
In respect of at least computer programs and cinemato-
graphic works, a party shall provide authors and successors
in title the right to authorize or prohibit the commercial
rental to the public of originals or copies of their copyright-
ed works. A member shall be excepted from this obligation
in respect of cinematographic works unless such rental has
led to widespread copying of such works which is material-
ly impairing the exclusive right of reproduction conferred
in that party on authors and their successors in title.'0 3
This provision illustrates a concern for the market interest of au-
thors and creators of certain kinds of works when another person
obtains a pecuniary benefit in the work, or when there is an inter-
ference with the exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution.
U.S. support of the intellectual property component of GATT dem-
onstrates a concern for videocassette "piracy" and the potential
interference with an author's rights caused by video rentals. The
federal government, however, has yet to take any remedial action.
Video rentals interfere with the market interest of producers of
100. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Although rental of software
and music is prohibited under § 109(b), the same prohibitions do not apply to
videocassettes.
101. Kernochan, supra note 22, at 1421.
102. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN. TNC/W/FA, Dec. 20, 1991, Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods
[hereinafter GATr].
103. Id. art. 11 (emphasis added).
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video products as there is no collection of royalties based upon
rental volume.1t 4 The money a creator of a work receives bears
little relationship to the number of consumers that view the prod-
uct." 5 Unlike record rentals, videocassette rentals do not interfere
with reproduction because of the lack of durability inherent in
videocassettes and the nature of the market. This lack of durability
requires video stores to purchase replacement copies after heavy
use." Congress has not yet acted to balance the public interest of
access of video rentals with the private interest of the creator, but
the recent GATT treaty indicates that a change in policy may occur
in the near future. Currently, however, section 109(a) of the Copy-
right Act governs, and the first sale doctrine allows purchasers to
rent the videotapes totally unencumbered.1
0 7
3. Software Rentals
The advent of software rentals offers the most recent example
of tension within the first sale doctrine where Congress has acted.
Software programs are often extremely expensive to develop.'0 8
The copying of software, however, provides an inexpensive alterna-
tive to purchasing."°9 Software rentals benefit all parties except the
creator of the work. When software is rented, individuals can bor-
row the software and copy it at a fraction of the actual cost." " The
104. The first sale doctrine extends only to new copies of works but not private
rentals of existing copies. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
105. Rather, the royalty accrues based on the purchases made by the intermediate
distributors/renters of the videotapes as a function of sales. See Senate Hearings, supra
note 61, at 238; Opri, supra note 91, at 331; Beard, supra note 91, at 436.
106. To the extent that the copies are not perfectly durable, the videocassettes are
reflective of some market demand. However, the ability to rent repeatedly still drives the
overall demand toward competitive equilibrium pricing.
107. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
108. Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, in Symposium, Toward a Third Intellectual Property Paradigm, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2310, 2371-78 (1994).
109. Id. at 2332-65. See also Dennis S. Karjala, Misappropriation as a Third Intel-
lectual Property Paradigm, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2594, 2598-99 (1994).
110. Vance Franklin Brown, Comment, The Incompatibility of Copyright and Com-
puter Software: An Economic Evaluation and a Proposal for a Marketplace Solution, 66
N.C. L. REV. 977, 980 (1988); Judith Klerman Smith, Comment, The Computer Software
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"pirate" obtains a copy of the work without any degradation in
quality.'' The commercial renter makes significant profits by
renting the software repeatedly without significant degradation in
quality and by suffering no extra financial liability beyond the
initial purchase. The creator of the work loses all distribution
rights at the time of the first sale and is not compensated for the
rentals, despite the interference with his reproduction and distribu-
tion rights.
Protection of software is problematic because of the nature of
its use."l2 When an individual pirates software, she has the ability
to use the pirated work ad infinitum." 3 Computer discs, like CDs,
do not deteriorate quickly because they are scanned by a laser rath-
er than by direct physical interaction. Also, in the event the disc
wears down, the user can simply copy the program on to a new
disc. Thus, the owners and manufacturers of that software may
lose a sale each time software is rented and copied instead of pur-
chased. 14
Rental Act: Amending the "First Sale Doctrine" to Protect Computer Software Copy-
right, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1613, 1615 (1987).
111. Karjala, supra note 109, at 2594. See generally Wendy Gordon, Assertive
Modesty: An Economics of Intangibles, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2579 (1994) (discussing the
economics and risks of intellectual property rights).
112. Some commentators have argued that the nature of the use and the structure of
the software is incompatible with copyright. Randall Davis, The Nature of Software and
Its Consequences for Establishing and Evaluating Similarity, 5 SOFTWARE L.J. 299
(1992); Peter S. Mcneil, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application
Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1989); Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The
Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine Readable Form,
1984 DUKE L.J. 663.
113. Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1988: Hearings on S. 2727
Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1988) [hereinafter Computer Software Rental Hear-
ings 1]; Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 198 Before
the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1989) [hereinafter Computer Software Rental Hearings
11] (statement of Heidi Roizen, President, Software Publishers Association); Corsello,
supra note 13, at 201.
114. Some opponents of the expansion of a software creator's distribution rights
argue that the rentals allow for "try before you buy." They argue that because so many
programs are very complicated, rental allows consumers to test the product. Rather than
reducing the software sales market, such a scheme allows for an expansion in that market.
Smith, supra note 110, at 1624.
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Initially, private efforts to limit the rental or unauthorized re-
production of software were unsuccessful." 5 The two most com-
monly employed methods were embedded code protection and
shrink wrap licensing agreements." 6 Embedded codes were. pro-
grams embedded in the software to prevent the unauthorized copy-
ing of the product." 7 Efforts to maintain a viable code which pre-
cluded copying ultimately proved futile." 8 Many software rental
businesses sold code breaking software to facilitate the copying of
software, thereby encouraging piracy. " 9 These embedded codes
inevitably failed, and the software was left unprotected. °
Another technique used by the computer industry was to license
the software to consumers at large through "shrink wrap" licensing
agreements.' 2 ' The software was wrapped in shrink wrap and, by
tearing open the package, the purchaser would theoretically consent
to the terms of the licensing agreement. One of the terms of the
agreement typically prohibited resale or rental. 22 Such efforts at
licensing have been extremely controversial, and some courts have
explicitly struck them down. 123 Some states, however, have passed
115. Id. at 1630-36.
116. Id. at 1630.
117. One type of code protection scheme embeds a date on the software. The
software is then programmed to no longer function after that date. Other embedded code
protection systems encode software instructions to specifically preclude copying.
118. Smith, supra note 110, at 1626.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1634-36.
121. For articles addressing issues involving shrink wrap licenses, see Gary W.
Hamilton & Jeffrey C. Hood, The Shrink-Wrap License-Is It Really Necessary?, 10
COMPUTER L. 16 (1993); Karen Puhala, Note, The Protection of Computer Software
Through Shrink-Wrap License Agreements, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347 (1985); David
A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of
Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 543
(1992); David A. Rice, Licensing the Use of Computer Program Copies and the Copyright
Act First Sale Doctrine, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 157 (1990); Michael Schwarz, Note, Tear-Me-
Open License Agreements: A Uniform Commercial Code Perspective on an Innovative
Contract of Adhesion, 7 COMPUTER L.J. 261 (1986).
122. Smith, supra note 110, at 1630-31.
123. Shrink-wrap licenses have generally been unenforceable under traditional con-
tract law as courts view them as a unilateral attempt to add conditions to the purchase of
a good without any additional consideration. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655
F. Supp. 750 (E.D. La. 1987); S.O.S. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989);
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statutes expressly validating such "shrink wrap" agreements.12
Aside from the state legislative validation of the shrink wrap li-
censes, the enforceability of these clauses is unclear at best.1
25
Thus, such private contractual remedies have been only marginally
successful and does not assure creators of adequate protection of
their market interest.
In an effort to limit the rental and unauthorized reproduction of
computer software, Representative Patricia Schroeder of Colorado
introduced the Software Rental Act in Congress in the late 1980s.1
26
In introducing the bill, Representative Schroeder analogized soft-
ware rental to record rental, maintaining that copying from diskette
to diskette was even faster and more efficient than copying from
record or compact disc to tape.127 By curbing the duplication of
licensed software and thereby increasing sales, the Software Rental
Act strove to increase incentives to create new software. 2' Con-
gress believed that allowing software rental did not serve the public
interest.' 29 Although no immediate action was taken, Representa-
tive Schroeder's concerns later provided the foundation of the
Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990 ("Software
Rental Act") which gave authors of software the right to authorize
or prohibit the rental of software copies. 3 '
Congress created a number of exceptions to the general prohibi-
Allen v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 583 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Mo. 1984); A &
M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App.3d 473, 489 (Cal. App. 1982); Accusystems,
Inc. v. Honeywell Info. Sys., 580 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
124. See, e.g., Illinois Software License Enforcement Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29,
paras. 801-808 (1986), repealed by 1987 11. Laws 85-254 § 1, 85-264 § 1; LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 51:1963 (West 1987).
125. In fact, one court has held that such state legislation is preempted by federal
law. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 762 (E.D. La. 1987).
126. H.R. 4949, 99th Cong. 2d Sess., 132 CoNG. REC. H3437 (daily ed. June 5,
1986).
127. 132 CONG. REC. 12,294-95 (1986).
128. 136 CONG. REC. S16,310-11 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
129. Computer Software Rental Hearings 1, supra note 113, at 15; Computer Soft-
ware Rental Hearings HI, supra note 113, at 16.
130. Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104
Stat. 5089 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (Supp. V 1993)) [hereinafter Software Rental
Act]. The Software Rental Act is consistent with article 11 of the GATI Treaty.
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tion against software rentals. Nonprofit libraries and educational
institutions could loan software to individuals.' These institutions
were specifically excepted because Congress believed that they
served a "valuable public purpose"'32 and did not want to under-
mine their objectives.'33
The Software Rental Act also exempted hardware rentals which
contained video game software and software which could not be
copied in the normal use of the machine. 1 This exemption was
created in order to facilitate and allow for hardware rentals.
35
Since many cars, microwaves, and other modern-day amenities
have software embedded in the product, Congress believed that a
limitation on the rentals of these products would be unduly prohibi-
tive and would not serve the purposes of copyright law. 36 Thus,
Congress permitted rentals of these types of equipment under the
Software Rental Act.
137
The Software Rental Act also changed the exclusive rights
granted to the software creator. 38 It permitted copying or adapta-
tion of software if: (1) it was an essential step in the use of the
program in conjunction with a machine; or (2) the copy or adapta-
tion was used for archival purposes only.' 39 It allowed for backup
copies of software to be made and permitted repeated operation of
the software.' 4 Finally, it allowed a user to repair a program if the
user finds bugs in the system or to adapt a program to meet the
131. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
132. H.R. REP. No. 735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1990).
133. Id.
134. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (Supp. V 1993).
135. Most computer hardware, particularly video games, have software programs
embodied within them.
136. Computer Software Rental Hearings 11, supra note 113, at 15-16 (statement of
Rep. Kastenmeier).
137. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (1988).
138. See generally Robert A. Kreiss, Section 117 of the Copyright Act, 1991 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 1497 (1991) (outlining the changes in rights of software producers under § 117
of the Copyright Act).
139. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988); Kreiss, supra note 138, at 1498.
140. Each time the program is used, a copy of the program is made inside the soft-
ware. Section 117 allows the hardware to make such a copy without infringing on the
copyright of the software creator. See Kreiss, supra note 138, at 1507.
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requirements of a particular computer.' 41
By enacting the Software Rental Act, Congress preserved the
reproduction and distribution rights of software creators. In prohib-
iting software rentals in many situations, the Software Rental Act
modified the first sale doctrine by expanding it to reach the unau-
thorized rental and copying of computer software. 42
C. Summary of Rentals and Public Lending
Congress has drafted exceptions to the first sale doctrine with-
out fully appreciating the underlying problem causing the tensions
within the doctrine-specifically, the increased durability of new
mediums of expression coupled with increased low-cost access. 43
Durability precludes degradation in quality and facilitates continued
rental.' 44 Durable goods which are continually rented do not re-
quire extensive repurchase. 145 Thus, numerous people have access
to a particular rented work, and the author never receives a royalty
payment for such use. In these situations, the current copyright
141. Id.
142. The current approach of protecting software through copyright and limited
patent paradigms has been challenged recently by a number of commentators. See Sym-
posium, Toward a Third Intellectual Property Paradigm, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2307
(1994). The lead article argues that a third intellectual property paradigm is necessary in
order to protect software; accordingly, simply protecting substantially similar code is
ineffective and leads to under or overprotection and does not effectively address the
market interest of creators of software. Samuelson, supra note 108, at 2371-78. A
companion piece identifies other types of intellectual creations which suffer from similar
problems of protection. See J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and
Copyright Paradigms, in Symposium, supra, at 2432. It is this author's belief that Profes-
sor Reichman's "legal hybrid" hypothesis actually extends farther than his article identi-
fies. Original copyright paradigms were created to protect only books. However, when
market interest was identified as important for various artistic creations, copyright law
developed exclusive rights and provisions to deal with the nature of the value of the
creation, as identified by this article. The clearest example can be the addition of the
public performance right to accommodate songwriters' concerns under copyright law.
Thus, perhaps a more unified theory which is more market-oriented, as suggested by
Professor Samuelson, would be appropriate for all the legal hybrids which have devel-
oped. Samuelson, supra note 108, at 2378-2420.
143. See supra notes 61-142.
144. Coase, supra note 33, at 147-48.
145. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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paradigm fails to reward a creator based on market demand.
.Furthermore, modem technology has made the unauthorized
duplication of works in particular mediums of expression very
easy.146 The monitoring of such duplication remains exceedingly
difficult, 4 7 yet access to duplication equipment is available to con-
sumers who may readily exploit the easy method of unauthorized
duplication that rental and lending provides.
41
With regard to rentals, Congress has addressed this concern on
a case-by-case basis. 49 Congress has responded to unauthorized
interference with an author's exclusive rights of reproduction and
distribution by enacting legislation limiting software and record
rental. 50  By prohibiting commercial rental of software and
phonorecords, Congress has confined the application of the first
sale doctrine and has expanded the distribution right of authors
working in these mediums.' 5' Congress, however, has not taken
action to limit video rentals and book lending (through a public
lending right). 52 In part, the lack of legislation is due to the diffi-
culty and cost in copying literary works and because the nature of
audiovisual and literary works do not lend themselves to repeated
use.'53 Additionally, Congress has determined that the public inter-
est in access to intellectual creation of these goods outweighs any
substantial change in the first sale doctrine.
IV. CURRENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES TO THE DISTRIBUTION
RIGHT
A. Resale Royalties or Droit de Suite for Visual Arts
Unlike rentals, resales historically have not involved a signifi-
146. For instance, stereo systems often have features allowing taping directly from
a CD player. Similarly, software can be copied from disk to disk in seconds.
147. Corsello, supra note 13, at 178.
148. Computer Software Rental Hearings II, supra note 113, at 16 (statement of
Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights).
149. See supra notes 61-142.
150. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
151. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(b)(1), 117 (Supp. V 1993).
152. See supra notes 58-60 (public lending) and 90-94 (video rentals) and accompa-
nying text.
153. See supra notes 58-60 and 94-99 and accompanying text.
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cant interference with the exclusive rights granted to a copyright
holder. 54  Despite this lack of interference, resale royalties are
granted to visual artists in many European countries and in Califor-
nia. 155 A "work of visual art" includes paintings, drawings, sculp-
tures, and, in certain cases, photographs. 15
6
The policy underlying resale royalties, or droit de suite rights,
for visual artists is the belief that authors should share in the profit-
able disposition of their works.15 7  Unlike books, computer pro-
grams, and musical compositions, the primary value of a work of
visual art is in the original. 58 As such, artists are different from
other creators and authors because artists can not generally rely on
the sale of numerous copies of their original works for their finan-
cial or market success. 59  Additionally, the unique nature of the
154. See Opri, supra note 91, at 331 (discussing shifts in policy restraining uses of
goods except for resales); Horowitz, supra note 22, at 67-68 (arguing for incorporating
the concept of economic harm into copyright law because of the effect of resales). See
also Richard P. Adelstein & Steven I. Peretz, The Competition of Technologies in Markets
for Ideas: Copyright and Fair Use in Evolutionary Perspective, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
209, 224 (1985) (discussing the economic ramifications of competition between various
forms of access). See generally L. RAY PA'TTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE (1968) (describing the development of copyright to accommodate market
interests).
155. GoRMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 46, at 494. For example, the California
resale law states:
Whenever a work of fine art is sold and the seller resides in California or the
sale takes place in California, the seller or his agent shall pay to the artist of
such work of fine art or to such artist's agent 5 per cent of the amount of such
sale.
CAL CIV. CODE § 986 (West 1984).
Additionally, there is no uniformity among countries as to whether prints and repro-
ductions of the original work are exempt from protection after the first sale of such a
copy. California, for example, does not extend the resale royalty to resales of prints of
a visual work. See also John E. Mclnerney, California Resale Royalties Act: Private
Sector Enforcement, 19 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 9 (1984) (examining California's system of
resale royalties).
156. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (definition of "work of visual art").
157. Stewart, supra note 46, at 70.
158. Elliott C. Alderman, Resale Royalties in the United States for Fine Visual
Artists: An Alien Concept, 40 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 265, 270 (1992) (reproduction and
adaptation of a work is highly unusual and occurs with only the most successful works).
159. Id. at 268; Neil F. Siegel, The Resale Royalty Provisions of the Visual Artists
Rights Act: Their History and Theory, 93 DICK. L. REV. 1, 9 (1988).
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market for visual arts is problematic. Often, financial exigency
compels a visual artist to prematurely sell a work for less than its
true value. 16° Since the true value of a work of visual art often
goes unrealized until many years after the original sale or even
after the artist has passed away, the artist is never adequately com-
pensated because of the first sale doctrine. 16 This substantial time
lag in appreciation is considered unique to visual arts. 1 62 The droit
de suite is an attempt to compensate the visual artist for the fact
that his reproduction and distribution rights are initially commer-
cially insignificant.1 63 Proponents of droit de suite legislation argue
that it provides economic incentives for visual artists similar to
those granted to authors and composers."
Finally, visual art is one of the few copyrightable items that
does not necessarily deteriorate with use. Furthermore, the nature
of the use of visual art is substantially different from other copy-
rightable works. "Use" of visual art, for example, is mere posses-
sion. "Uses" of other copyrightable goods, on the other hand,
traditionally involve direct physical interaction with the good.
Whereas a book's spine will get bent and a record will wear out,
a picture will be kept on a wall. Particularly valuable art will ordi-
narily be protected with proper encasements and climate control.
This controlled durability may contribute to the ability of art to
appreciate in value over time.
French, German and Belgian laws present three different theo-
ries to justify the resale royalty for visual arts.1 65 The French sys-
160. LILIANE DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, THE DROIT DE SUITE IN LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC PROPERTY: A COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY 18-20 (1991); Siegel, supra note 159,
at 8.
161. Alderman, supra note 158, at 270.
162. Siegel, supra note 159, at 8.
163. DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 160, at 18-20. See also P. Katzenberger,
The Droit de Suite in Copyright Law, 4 INT'L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L.
361, 367-68 (1973) (stating that authors often sell their works before they have value and
that originals are often the primary source of value for visual art).
164. See, e.g., Thomas M. Goetzl & Stuart A. Sutton, Copyright and the Visual
Artist's Display Right: A New Doctrinal Analysis, 9 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 15, 38
(1984) (evaluating rights of artists under Visual Artists Rights Act).
165. Paul Sherman, Incorporation of the Droit de Suite into United States Copyright
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tem emerges from a droit moral theory which attaches the person-
ality of the artist to the creation.66 As a result of this close link,
the artist should be compensated for the exploitation of the work. 167
This entitles the artist to share in the proceeds from resale. 68 Due
to the nature of the right, the artist's claim to resale royalties is
inalienable. 69
The German law assumes that the work of visual art has a la-
tent, unrealized value. 7  That value exists at the time of initial sale
and vests in the creator of the work.' 7' Thus, the artist has a right
to claim a portion of the future profits as the latent value existed
at the time of creation. 172 When the work is sold, the creator is paid
a portion of the increased price. 7
3
The Belgian system of resale royalties is premised on an unjust
enrichment theory. 74  According to this approach, subsequent
events and circumstances increase the value of the work of visual
art. 75 Denying the artist the right to claim a resale royalty in lieu
of changed circumstances provides unjust enrichment to the initial
purchaser. 76 Thus, a resale royalty is granted to avoid such unjust
enrichment. 17
7
California has enacted a statute providing for resale royalty,
largely based upon French law. 178 The California law allows the
artist to obtain a certain percentage of the sales price, as long as
Law, 18 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 50, 58 (1970).
166. Id. at 58.
167. Id.
168. Note, The Applicability of the Droit de Suite in the United States, 3 B.C. INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 433, 437 (1980); McInerney, supra note 155, at 4.
169. Rita E. Hauser, The French Droit de Suite: The Problem of Protection for the
Underprivileged Artist Under the Copyright Law, 6 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 94, 103
(1959).
170. Sherman, supra note 165, at 58.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 59-60.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 62.
175. Id. at 63.
176. Id. at 63.
177. Mclnerney, supra note 155, at 4-5; Sherman, supra note 165, at 59.
178. Sherman, supra note 165, at 59.
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the resale of the work of visual art exceeds the original sale price
by a certain amount.179 In order to be eligible to receive a resale
royalty under the California law, the work must be sold in Califor-
nia or be created by a California resident.180 California courts have
considered and rejected the claim that the first sale doctrine pre-
empts the resale royalties act.181 The courts have held that the
royalties simply require a payment but do not limit the ability of
the sellers to rent or sell the work to whomever they wish.1 82 As
such, no restraint on alienation exists.
Enforcing droit de suite legislation has been difficult. The only
country effectively enforcing the resale right is France."8 3 France
has enjoyed success because it provides a comprehensive artwork
registration scheme, whereby a central organization-representing
virtually all French visual artists-tracks all sales of artwork and
collects royalties for its members.'l By tracking the sales and
collecting the royalties, the droit de suite rights are protected.1 85
Some argue that a droit de suite system can only be effective when
an adequate monitoring and collection system is in place.1
8 6
179. Id.
.180. Mclnerney, supra note 155, at 1-6 (citing CAL. CIv. CODE § 986 (West 1984)).
181. Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
983 (1980) ('.'he work can be transferred without restriction. The fact that a resale may
create a liability to the creator artist or a state instrumentality and, at the same time,
constitute an exercise of a right guaranteed by the Copyright Act does not make the
former a legal restraint on the latter."); Bob Jones, Morseburg v. Balyon-The High Court
Grants Royalty A Reprieve: Constitutional Challenges to the California Resale Royalties
Act, 3 CoMM./ENT. L. J. I (1980)(evaluating Ninth Circuit holding that California resale
royalty law is not preempted by federal Copyright law). See also Jay B. Johnson, Com-
ment, Copyright: Droit de Suite: An Artist is Entitled to Royalties Even After He's Sold
His Soul to the Devil, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 493 (1986) (discussing Morseburg and effect of
resale royalty).
182. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 977-78.
183. Mclnerney, supra note 155, at 13; Hauser, supra note 169, at 101.
184. Mclnerney, supra note 155, at 13.
185. Similar such societies have been advocated for the California Resale Act. See,
e.g., Hamish R. Sandison, California Enacts a Droit Moral and a Droit de Suite, 3 ART
& L., Mar. 1977, at 1, 5 (discussing method for registering works and collecting based
on resale); Mclnerney, supra note 155, at 19-21 (outlining California scheme for monitor-
ing resales).
186. Siegel, supra note 159, at 14.
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Historically, the United States has been reluctant to enact droit
de suite legislation. 87  However, two recent events have signaled
a reassessment of current United States policy. First, the United
States became a member of the Berne Convention in 1989.188 Arti-
cle 14ter of the Berne Convention formally recognizes an artists'
droit de suite. 89 Article 14ter does not require, however, that mem-
ber states enact droit de suite legislation nor does it explicitly en-
dorse or expand moral rights of authors. Rather, it only requires
droit de suite in situations where both states have resale royalty
laws.19° Even though the United States is not bound to enact droit
de suite legislation under the Berne Convention, its recognition of
such a right represents a significant change in policy.
Second, in December of 1990, President Bush signed into law
the Visual Artists Rights Act which created federal moral rights of
attribution and integrity for visual artists. 19 More importantly, the
legislation required the Register of Copyrights, in conjunction with
the Chair of the National Endowment for the Arts, to study the
feasibility of implementing a resale royalty for the visual arts. 92
On December 1, 1992, the Register of Copyrights, after conducting
a feasibility study, declined to endorse resale royalties for visual
artists. 93 The Register did provide, however, a suggested model
187. See, e.g., Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5089 (1990). For further analysis of the bill, see Perlmutter, supra note 16, at 284-314.
The most recent proposed legislation allowed the author to collect three to five per cent
of the sale price. See generally Symposium, Artists' Rights: The Kennedy Proposal to
Amend the Copyright Law, 7 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 227 (1989); Siegel, supra note
159, at 1 (discussing viability and efficacy of Visual Artists Rights Act).
188. Berne Convention, supra note 55.
189. Berne Convention, supra note 55, art. 14'. See also S. TREATY DOC. No. 27,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1986).
190. Lee D. Neumann, The Berne Convention and Droit de Suite Legislation in the
United States: Domestic and International Consequences of Federal Incorporation of
State Law for Treaty Implementation, 16 COLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 157, 159 (1992).
191. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 52128 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A
(1990)).
192. Id.; Carol Sky, Report of the Register of Copyrights Concerning Droit de Suite,
the Artists' Resale Royalty: A Response, 40 J. OF COPYRIGHT SoC'Y 315 (1992) (chal-
lenging the Register of Copyright's report against resale royalties); Alderman, supra note
158, at 266 (explaining the relevant provisions of the Visual Artists Rights Act).
193. Perlmutter, supra note 16, at 286.
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for a droit de suite system which included a private collecting
society to audit public sales of visual art.' 94 There will continue to
be concerns as to how to provide the proper incentives to visual
artists consistent with international and national copyright law and
the Visual Artists Rights Act. 95 At the very least, the recognition
of a limited droit de suite right provides hope to proponents of
expanding resale royalty rights that there is congressional support
for future changes to existing policies.
B. Compact Disc Resales
The resale of compact discs poses the most recent and the most
substantial threat to an author's distribution right.'9 Compact discs
do not deteriorate with use. Since compact discs are durable
goods, they can be redistributed among many consumers and will
not deteriorate in quality. A consumer can then buy a CD, either
copy it onto a tape or listen to it for a period of time, and then
resell it. The second purchaser has the choice of buying the used
CD at a discounted price or buying a new disc at full price.
97
Since the goods are virtually indistinguishable, most consumers will
buy the used discs if they are available. 9" The first sale doctrine
precludes any royalty from being paid to the copyright owner for
resold compact discs.19
In a recent study conducted by the National Association of
Recording Merchandisers, 84% of CD consumers surveyed had
never purchased a used CD.200 Out of this 84%, however, 83%
said they expect to purchase a used CD in the future.20 1 Seventeen
194. Id. at 310. The matter is still under consideration, and no changes have been
made to the policy as yet.
195. Id. at 295.
196. See generally Carla M. Miller, Note, New Technology and Old Protection: The
Case for Resale Royalties on the Retail Sale of Used CDs, 46 HAST. L.J. 217 (1994).
197. Id. at 224-25.
198. Ed Christman, Both Retailer, Label Claims Backed by Used-CD Survey, BILL-
BOARD, Oct. 2, 1993, at 4.
199. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988).
200. Ed Christman, Distributors Offer Used CD Sellers Ad-Dollar Paybacks, BILL-
BOARD, Feb. 26, 1994, at 4.
201. Id.
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percent of the respondents said that if the used CD they purchased
had not been available, they would have bought a new copy of that
disc.202  Furthermore, 57.3% of the respondents said that they
would buy more new CDs if used CDs were generally unavail-
able. °3 The study also noted that of stores selling new and used
CDs, two-thirds of them had 25% or less of their total inventory in
used CDs; 18% had 25-50% of their total inventory in used CDs;
and an additional 18% had more than half their inventory repre-
sented by used CDs.204 Finally, 24.6% of the respondents said they
purchase more used CDs because they can be resold, while 41.4%
said resale is currently not a factor in their CD purchases.20 5 This
survey is the only one of its kind conducted thus far, although
many distributors in the music industry estimate that used CDs will
amount to 20% of the total CD market by 19 9 8 .206
The findings of the survey confirm that the durability of used
CDs interferes with an author's distribution right as it creates a
resale market that is competitive with the initial one. While the
prospect of resale has increased total CD sales, a large segment of
the consuming population buys and resells CDs in subsequent mar-
kets. By stocking and selling large quantities of the used CDs, a
large number of retailers are interfering with the copyright holder's
market interest.207 Finally, a significant portion of consumers has
acknowledged that if a used CD did not exist, they would buy a
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. The study also found that 32% of the resales were promotional titles and
9% were from record clubs. Id. New titles were 14% of the total purchases and 86%
were catalog titles. Id.
205. Id.
206. Used CDs are Integral to Industry, BILLBOARD, Aug. 14, 1993, at 4.
207. This interference has caused extensive disputes between resellers and music
publishers. In 1993, for instance, a number of retailers announced their intention to
promote resale markets by reselling CDs in their stores. Jane Birnbaum, Without a
Scratch, Used CDs Rise Again, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1993, at 35. The music industry
responded with threats to remove various promotional allowances and refused to supply
the retailers with new releases of certain musicians. The dispute ended in a stalemate and
a settlement after retailers threatened an antitrust lawsuit. See Wherehouse Entertainment,
Inc. v. CEMA, No. 93-4253 (C.D. Cal., filed July 19, 1993); Christman, supra note 200,
at 6.
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new one. When a consumer buys a used CD instead of a new one,
the artist is uncompensated for his intellectual creation-resulting
in a diminution of his distribution right.208
C. A Look to the Future
1. Videodiscs
The advent of videodiscs may prove to be a strong challenge to
the commercial appeal of videocassettes. 2' Videodiscs demonstrate
many of the same principles as compact discs in that they are dura-
ble goods that do not deteriorate with use. Videodiscs are currently
harder to produce, however, because they contain both sound and
pictures, requiring considerably more storage space. Additionally,
at the moment there is no standard videodisc format, so that few
people are willing to invest thousands of dollars in a system that
may become obsolete in a few years.210 Since the videodisc indus-
try is in its infancy, some argue that its potential for interference
with an author's market interest is insubstantial.2" Such arguments
are misguided. The primary market for a videodisc would be the
rental market because of the nature of the product. Since a video-
disc is more durable than videotape, the need for replacement is
dramatically reduced. As such, purchase of replacement videodiscs
would occur less frequently than purchase of replacement video-
tapes by commercial renters.21 The decrease in the frequency of
208. Any attempt to contractually limit the resale of CDs would invariably encounter
the same problems as shrink wrap licensing agreements, and would most likely be unen-
forceable. See supra note 123. Furthermore, authors and crdators do not have the bar-
gaining power to limit resales or to require compensation from distributors.
209. Because each videocassette is not used indefinitely and because videocassettes
have become firmly established in the market, the development of videodiscs presently
poses less of a threat than other technological developments. Furthermore, videodisc
popularity has been limited by its high cost and unwieldy size. The advent of CD-ROM
technology, however, may lower the cost and decrease the size of videodiscs, thus result-
ing in a boon to its popularity and access.
210. See, e.g., Scott Hettrick, Matsushita DVD Does Double Take: Sony's One-Sided
Standard Adopted by Rivals, HOLLYWOOD REP., Apr. 20, 1995 (discussing the current
"format wars" in the development of digital video discs).
211. The effect is much the same as CD technology. See supra notes 61-80 and
accompanying text.
212. The initial market for purchasers of videodiscs may increase, however, because
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purchases to replace used and deteriorated copies will result in
lower royalties to producers, and purchased copies will be even less
indicative of market success than with videocassette rentals.
2. On-Line Services
Perhaps the greatest threat to the first sale doctrine is the advent
of on-line services.2t 3 Soon, an individual will be able to obtain a
song (without renting an actual copy), a television show, computer
software, or a "soft copy" of a book through downloading or sim-
ply accessing the information from an on-line service.2"4  Access
will occur on a computer from a single copy in a central database.
On an on-line network, copies are not necessarily made. On-line
services make a tangible good completely durable and instantly
available for an immeasurable period of time.215
The exclusive rights/limited monopoly scheme collapses when
a completely durable good with widespread public access, like an
on-line service, is used in the market.216  On-line services supply
of the possibility of reselling the videodiscs in a secondary market.
213. The developing system of electronic distribution is often referred to as the
National Information Infrastructure or the "information superhighway."
214. For a brief discussion on the role of on-line services as an alternate distribution
system, see James Daly, Music by Modem: On-Line Services Provide a High-Tech Option
to Music Distribution, ROLLING STONE, July 14-28, 1994, at 31. Underground music
organizations, such as the Internet Underground Music Archive ("IUMA"), are already
putting music on-line via the internet. Id.
215. Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of
Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1918-22 (1992); J.H. Reichman, Elec-
tronic Information Tools-the Outer Edge of World Intellectual Property Law, 17 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 797, 823-25 (1992). See also L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY
LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT-A LAW OF USERS' RIGHTs 159, 181-90 (1991).
216. Cf. Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding that
the electronic distribution of pictures on an electronic bulletin board violated plaintiff's
exclusive right to display its copy); Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys.
Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 363 (E.D. Va. 1994) (holding that a program stored only in
Random Access Memory ("RAM") is sufficiently fixed to constitute a copy and may have
too much delay to be considered simultaneous fixation); Sega Enterprises v. MAPHIA,
857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Playboy and MAI placed liability on a party as a
direct infringer of rights. In MAI, the copying into RAM was admitted by the defendant.
However, through on-line systems, the person who places the creation on-line does not
affirmatively or actively engage in any copying, reproduction, display, or distribution. In
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information and services to a network of subscribers from a cen-
trally maintained, continually updated database.217 Such a service
obviates the need for dissemination of tangible copies. Since there
is technically no access to multiple copies, no royalty is required
under existing copyright law, and the other exclusive rights argu-
ably provide little extra protection.21" Further, because a central
database suffers no deterioration based on use, an infinite number
of people can access the data base and extract information free of
any royalty liability. In fact, with complete durability, the price of
the product becomes independent of the number of suppliers. 9
This scenario increases the "number of individuals who will be
provided with access to a work by one and the same copy, thus
diminishing the number of sales and enabling third party exploiters
to realize additional receipts., 220  The entire distribution right
scheme will collapse with the advent of on-line services unless a
more market-oriented approach is taken with respect to the medi-
ums of expression, access to these mediums, and the forms of ex-
orderfor the right to be infringed, a purchaser of the service must access it. Thus, no
infringement occurs until a user of the on-line system makes a copy, which may be
unknown to the provider and is out of the control of the provider. Thus, the Playboy and
MAI holdings may not be viable. Sega, on the other hand, applied the correct analysis
but reached an incorrect result. In Sega, MAPHIA was held liable as a contributory
infringer because they provided the means for copying. This holding may stand in direct
opposition to Sony, which held that simply providing equipment capable of copying was
not sufficient to establish contributory infringement liability. 464 U.S. at 417. The sale
of such equipment, according to the court, is not contributory infringement if the sale is
widely used for legitimate, noninfringing purposes. Id. Furthermore, even presuming that
infringement in these limited situations, the other exclusive rights are still left unprotected.
See Nil REPORT, supra note 44, at 41 ("It is clear that a Frena subscriber [in Playboy],
at the end of a transaction possessed a copy of a Playboy photograph, but it is rather less
clear whether, under current law, Frena 'distributed' that photograph or the subscriber
'reproduced' it .. ") It is unclear whether if the subscriber had reproduced the photo-
graph, whether current law clearly would have made Frena contributorily liable for the
unauthorized reproduction.
217. Reichman, supra note 215, at 823.
218. But see Playboy Enterprises v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993)
(finding that the electronic distribution of pictures violated plaintiffs display right).
219. Coase, supra note 33, at 144.
220. M. Thierry Desurmont, The Author's Right to Control the Destination of Copies
Reproducing His Work, 12 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTs 481, 482 (1988).
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pression themselves. 22'
The federal government has anticipated the problems of elec-
tronic distribution. In 1993, the President formed the Information
Infrastructure Task Force ("IITF") to examine electronic distribu-
tion systems and recommend changes to existing laws to accommo-
date the developing electronic infrastructure.222 The IITF report,
released in July 1994, recommended several changes to existing
copyright law. The working group conceived of electronic distribu-
tion as an infringement of the reproduction right but acknowledged
that enforcement of the reproduction right is extremely problemat-
ic.223 The working group recommended changes to existing law to
include electronic transmission as part of the distribution right.224
Further, the working group recommended that transmissions be
221. Samuelson, supra note 112, at 2365-70, 2378-94.
222. NIl REPORT, supra note 44.
223. Id. at 54. The Nil Report made the following observation:
The first sale doctrine's importance iinthe NIl context should not be underesti-
mated: if a transaction by which a user obtains a "copy" of a work is charac-
terized as a "distribution" then, under the current law, the user may be entitled
to make a like distribution without the copyright owner's permission (and with-
out liability for infringement).... Indeed the system encompassed by Sections
106(3) and 109(a) appears to "fit" only "conventional" transactions in which
possessory interests in tangible copies are conveyed....
Id. at 39.
224. Id. at 121. The NIl Report recommended that the Copyright Act be amended
to recognize that copies can be distributed by transmission. The proposed changes would
expand § 106(3) to include distribution by transmission. Id. The proposal also recom-
mends amending the definition of transmit in § 101 by adding the following language:
To "transmit" a reproduction is to distribute it by any device or process where-
by a copy or phonorecord of the work is fixed beyond the place from which it
was sent. In the case when a transmission may constitute both a communica-
tion of a performance or display and a distribution of a reproduction, such
transmission shall be considered a distribution of a reproduction if the primary
purpose or effect of the transmission is to distribute a copy or phonorecord of
the work to the recipient of the transmission.
Id. at 122. The report also expands the definition of publication to include publication
by transmission. Id. at 123-24. Finally, the report recommends that section 109(a) be
amended to specifically exempt the first sale doctrine when a copy is received by trans-
mission. Id. at 125. It should also be noted that two Congressional Bills, H.R. 2576 and
S. 1421, purport to add to the exclusive rights of a copyright owner in a sound recording
the right to perform or authorize the performance of a sound recording by digital trans-
mission.
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excepted from the first sale doctrine.225
V. THE SOLUTION: COMPULSORY COMMERCIAL BLANKET LICENs-
ING
Congress has acted to limit alienation and use of intellectual
property when a durable good threatens the exclusive rights and
market interest of the owner. The technological problems with
imperishable intellectual creations-specifically resales and on-line
access-have been insufficiently addressed by Congress and the
IITF.
The recommendations of the IITF represent positive steps to-
ward dealing with the problems of access and imperishable cre-
ations. The recommendations, however, do not address the under-
lying tensions inherent in durable secondary markets; nor do they
create a viable system of enforcement.
First, the recommendations do not address the underlying prob-
lem of access. If a person pays an on-line service for access to a
number of copyrightable works and only occasionally uses any one
of them, the report does not clearly explain whether the use of such
works for a temporary time constitutes any responsibility to pay a
royalty.226 Additionally, the report does not address partial use of
a copyrightable work. For instance, if only a short passage from
a book is used, the recommendations do not establish a system of
partial royalties based upon the nature and extent of use. The basis
of royalties and rewards for creators should be based upon the use
and demand for the product. The recommendations fail to fully
address the uses which subject an intellectual creation to royalty
payments.
Second, the recommendations do not provide any scheme for
enforcement. They acknowledge that enforcing the reproduction of
works is extremely difficult.227 Thus, the IITF concludes that mon-
225. Id. at 123.
226. This royalty liability is arguably enforceable under the public performance and
public display rights. Such analysis seems strained because the use will vary and will
typically be used in private environments.
227. NIl REPORT, supra note 44, at 35-37, 65-72.
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itoring distribution is a more effective solution.228 However, the
IITF provides no scheme for enacting and enforcing such a scheme.
This is particularly problematic since the on-line infrastructure is
controlled mainly by a myriad of private actors.229 This lack of
cohesion and rational development only hinders an effective en-
forcement mechanism. Unless an effective scheme for enforcement
is provided, the recommendations will be ineffective.
One of the alternative options suggested by the Register of
Copyrights ("Register") in its report to Congress was a commercial
rental right, which would give an artist control over the commercial
rentals of a work.230  The Register's alternative is instructive but
shortsighted. To fully reflect the market demand for copyrightable
works, a right or license should extend beyond that proposed in the
Register's scheme and should include all subsequent markets of
artistic works.231 Since protecting against infringement in subse-
228. Id. at 38-42, 53-56, 120-25.
229. The Nil Report also fails to recognize that the primary infringers are not neces-
sarily the people who place the work on an on-line system. Rather, these actors at best
induce, cause, or materially contribute to the infringing conduct of the 'users. See
Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162
(2d Cir. 1971) (holding that a management firm's authorization of clients' performance
of copyrighted compositions to be contributory infringement). Despite the NII's theory
that a contributory infringer may be liable based on the providing of services, see Nil
REPORT, supra note 44, at 75, the report does not address merely placing the copyright-
able good on the system without any other action. Rather than affirmatively interfering
with reproduction or distribution rights, the contributory infringer simply provides others
with access. In such situations, extending contributory infringement claims may be
considerably more difficult. See Auvil v. CBS, 800 F. Supp. 928 (E.D.Wa sh. 1992)
(serving merely as a conduit for access does not establish contributory liability); Cubby,
Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding that the operator of a
bulletin board service was not contributorily liable for libelous material uploaded from
the service); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (holding that
the manufacturer of videocassette recorders is not a contributory infringer facilitating
unauthorized reproduction of copyrighted works); see also Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software
Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (seller of computer programs to defeat anti-copying
protection is not liable as contributory infringer); but see Sega Enterprises, 857 F. Supp.
at 679.
230. U.S. COPYRIGHT OMCE, DROIT DE SUITE: THE ARTIST'S RESALE ROYALTY
149-51 (1992). The alternative was discussed in little detail beyond attempting to com-
pensate authors through commercial rentals.
231. But see Reichman, supra note 215, at 825; Ginsburg, supra note 215, at 1919.
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quent markets would be difficult for an individual artist, a national
monitoring scheme would be the only effective means for prevent-
ing unauthorized use.232 Such a scheme increases artists' incentives
and furthers the underlying goals of copyright law.233 In order to
protect the policy of freedom of alienation, the license granted
should be compulsory.234
A. The Structure of Blanket Licensing
Currently, the largest and most developed system for blanket
licensing in the United States involves the public performance right
for music writers and publishers. 35 The blanket license, authorized
through various performing rights organizations, gives the consum-
er the right to perform any music at any time for which the license
is effective.236
232. Maralee Buttery, Note, Blanket Licensing: A Proposal for the Protection and
Encouragement of Artistic Endeavor, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1245, 1246 (1983).
233. See Barry W. Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for
Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1100 (1971) (discuss-
ing economic incentives to create and protect market interest of authors). But see Stephen
Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies and
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REv. 281 (1970) (arguing against extra limitations on
exclusive rights); Karjala, supra note 109, at 2594 (arguing against market oriented
licensing regimes); Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright and Misappropriation, 17 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 885 (1992) (arguing in favor of misappropriation theory for copyright protection).
Professor Karjala asserts that the more effective paradigm is misappropriation theory.
Although misappropriation is a viable alternative, it can lead to inefficiencies in the
market. Under misappropriation theory, the claim for infringement arises after the taking
of protectable material. Karjala, supra note 109, at 2601-08. Under this theory, protec-
tion will only arise once a lawsuit is filed. Rather than characterize the problem as
adversarial .in nature and raising the costs because of litigation, a more market-oriented,
efficient market approach is necessary. Responding proactively through a licensing
scheme similar to the one proposed in Samuelson, supra note 112, at 2413-20, 2426-29,
may be a more effective and efficient solution.
234. But see Coase, supra note 33, at 148; Liebowitz, supra note 28 at 49; Benjamin
& Kormendi, supra note 35, at 381.
235. Other countries also have collection society schemes. See supra notes 50-53 and
accompanying text regarding Germany's system for public lending rights, and supra notes
154-195 and accompanying text for systems to protect visual artists. For a brief discus-
sion of licensing techniques available, see Nil REPORT, supra note 44, at 33.
236. SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 17, at 196-218. For a thorough discussion
of performing rights organizations, see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
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The artist grants the performing rights organization the right to
license her work in exchange for the benefits of membership.237 To
avoid antitrust claims, the artist is also permitted to grant licenses
for public performances.238 Nonetheless, once artist authorization
is obtained, the performing rights organization issues blanket li-
censes to all parties using public performances of its members'
works.239 These parties include radio stations, music halls, restau-
rants, and stores. Anyone seeking to perform the works publicly
must obtain a blanket license from the performing rights organiza-
tion or the individual artists.2' As part of the license, the perform-
ing rights organization retains the right to periodically audit the
licensee's books to ensure fair payment.24' The performing rights
organization then takes the money it has obtained through the issu-
ance of blanket licenses and disperses the funds between members
based on frequency of public performance.242
B. The Advantages of Blanket Licensing
Blanket licensing has the benefit of administrative conve-
nience.243 By consolidating all licenses into one, the system pro-
Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
237. SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 17, at 196-210.
238. See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. 1, for a discussion of the antitrust issues in-
volved in the music licensing business.
239. SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 17, at 196-218. A similar system is a
compensation scheme for the so-called "mechanical right." The reproduction right for
phonorecords is often called the mechanical right. Id. at 237. Compulsory mechanical
licenses are required for audio recordings intended to be distributed to the public for
private use. Id. at 239. The Harry Fox Agency serves as a clearinghouse for the licenses
and supervises the collections from record companies and represents over 6,000 music
publishers. Id. at 242. The license calls for quarterly accountings and requires payments
for all records manufactured and distributed. Id. at 243. If the license payment is not
received, the Agency will revoke the license. Id. at 243.
240. See, e.g., Robert Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase & Intellectual Property, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2662-71 (1994); Robert Coasler, Copyright Compulsory Licens-
es-Are They Coming or Going?, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 231 (1990) (discussing the
advent of compulsory licenses and their viability); Stanley Besen, et al., An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Collectives, 78 VA. L. REV. 385 (1992).
241. SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 17, at 200-02.
242. Id. at 202-12.
243. The notion of licensing as a means for protecting intellectual creations has
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vides substantial economic efficiencies.2 The consumer is not
required to find every copyright owner and obtain a license from
that owner.4 5 Commercial entities do not have to predict whose
music will be played and can instead rely on the blanket license.
An additional benefit is that blanket licensing facilitates the
prevention of copyright infringement.24 6 A large collecting society
has the resources of a large number of people, whereas a single
artist would have extremely limited resources. Societies such as
ASCAP and BMI can use their own resources to track infringing
uses of their member's works so as to remedy any problems in an
efficient and timely manner. Also, the auditing function of the
performing rights organizations ensures artists that they are receiv-
ing their fair share of performance royalties.247
C. Limiting the Blanket License System
The United States has yet to recognize a public lending right.
The actions of Congress reflect a strong commitment to noncom-
mercial lending and free access to such facilities. - Thus far, Con-
gress has indicated that it does not consider public lending to im-
pose a great threat to the market interest of the author. As such,
noncommercial use of copyrighted work should not require blanket
licensing.248 If the lending institution obtains no pecuniary benefit
from the use, the author should not be entitled to impose an extra
tax upon that body. Thus, in order to accommodate noncommer-
cial interests, a blanket license should be limited to all commercial
actors using the work for their own pecuniary benefit.
gained further support as a potential solution. Samuelson, supra note 112, at 2413-20.
Such a scheme, it is argued, more effectively protects the market interests of authors and
creators. Id.
244. Buttery, supra note 232, at 1259.
245. Sigmund Timberg, The Antitrust Aspects of Merchandising Modern Music: The
ASCAP Consent Judgment of 1950, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 294, 298 (1954).
246. Buttery, supra note 232, at 1259.
247. Id. at 1261.
248. Noncommercial on-line access may present a problem in the future, however,
because of ease of access and duplication from such sources. Cf. Nil REPORT, supra note
44, at 79.
1995]
424 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
Another important limitation is that the collecting society
should not be able to award licenses selectively. Allowing the
society to do so would interfere with an individual's right to free-
dom of alienation, as a seller may decide not to vend to people
unable to obtain licenses. Since such a restriction is a significant
concern, the collecting society should be compelled to give a li-
cense to anyone who requests one but at a high enough cost that
monopolistic prices can be extracted. The scheme for royalties
shall be determined in much the same fashion as the current
ASCAP or BMI scheme to avoid claims of any price discrimina-
tion. Compulsory licensing will thus protect the interest of the
public by ensuring free alienability of consumer goods. 249
D. Implementing the Scheme
Compulsory commercial blanket licensing should apply to uses
of copyrightable subject matter. Whenever goods are resold or
rented, a royalty should be paid to a collection society organized
in much the same way as ASCAP or BMI. The royalties will be
determined by a comprehensive formula similar to the formulas
used by ASCAP or BMI.250 Any challenge to the royalty formulas
would be appealable to the Copyright Office. In order to effectuate
these goals, Congress must expand the exclusive rights to include
access royalties or royalties based on the nature of use. Additional-
ly, specific legislation permitting collection societies will be neces-
sary to avoid antitrust liabilities.
Before implementing a compulsory commercial blanket licens-
ing scheme, appropriate tests should be conducted. The first test
could involve the current issue of compact disc resales and its
effect on the market for new compact discs. Through the issuance
249. See supra notes 22-24.
250. ASCAP and BMI work in tandem with the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, an
agency established by the federal government to adjust royalty rates as required. SHEMEL
& KRASILOVSKY, supra note 17, at 158. The Copyright Royalty Tribunal is empowered
to establish reasonable terms and rates based upon the nature and type of use (i.e. public
performances, cable broadcasts, and jukeboxes). See 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-804 (1988);
GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 46, at 453-56.
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of a compulsory commercial resale license by a collection society,
the artist can be compensated for the resales without unduly inter-
fering with the alienability of the compact disc or rental of
videocassettes.25' If such a system proves effective, the licensing
could be expanded to include rental of compact discs. If that sys-
tem proves effective, the licensing scheme could continue to ex-
pand until it covered all copyrightable subject matter.
CONCLUSION
Durability of copyrightable goods presents a serious challenge
to the distribution right and the first sale doctrine. Congressional
efforts have been effective thus far with partially durable goods but
do not effectively address the underlying problems of durability
and access. Due to the lack of effort in this area, copyright holders
will continue to be plagued by many problems if an alternative
scheme is not created. .A viable alternative to the existing system
is the more malleable compulsory commercial blanket licensing
scheme. Compulsory commercial blanket licensing vitiates the
concern for the interference with the distribution right caused by
imperishable intellectual creations. The proposed system recogniz-
es that an author's market interest is not fully reflected in the first
sale and instead rewards the author based on access and use of a
product while attempting to minimize transaction costs. The com-
mercial blanket license will more effectively serve long-term con-
sumer interests by providing proper incentives to authors and cre-
ators, thus striking a proper balance between the public's interest
in access to these works and an author's interest in being remuner-
ated for her efforts.
251. Such a license would invariably increase the cost of rental.
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